Moving Upstream and Going Local: The Responsibility to Protect Ten Years Later by Moix, Bridget
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 98-100 98 
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183-2463) 
2015, Volume 3, Issue 3, Pages 98-100 
Doi: 10.17645/pag.v3i3.311 
 
Commentary 
Moving Upstream and Going Local: The Responsibility to Protect Ten 
Years Later 
Bridget Moix 
School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Arlington, VA 22201, USA;  
E-Mail: bmoix@masonlive.gmu.edu 
Submitted: 2 May 2015 | Accepted: 7 May 2015 | Published: 27 October 2015 
Abstract 
Ten years ago the international community pledged to protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity by endorsing the responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine. Yet today, horrific violence 
against civilians continues in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan. This article examines some of the progress and 
gaps in the international community’s efforts to better protect civilians against mass violence over the past decade. It 
proposes two emerging directions for advancing the R2P agenda in the coming years: 1) greater focus on upstream pre-
vention, and 2) increased support for locally-led peacebuilding and prevention actors and capacities. 
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Ten years ago, the international community pledged to 
protect civilians from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity by endorsing the 
responsibility to protect (R2P) doctrine at the 2005 
World Summit. Ten years later, horrific violence against 
civilians has now devastated tens of thousands of lives 
in places like Syria, Iraq, and South Sudan, with poten-
tial new waves of killing feared in countries like Burun-
di and Myanmar. Have we, as a global community, 
made any progress in making good on the now 70-year 
commitment of “never again”, or has R2P been just 
another unfulfilled promise by international leaders? 
The answer is a bit of both. Since the signing of the 
2005 World Summit Document that committed global 
leaders to the three pillars of R2P, important progress 
has been made at the normative, policy, and practical 
levels. R2P laid out three pillars of responsibility, and 
some progress on each can be seen. These include: 1) 
primary responsibility of states to prevent and protect 
their own people, 2) responsibility of the international 
community to support states in implementing that 
commitment, 3) and responsibility of the international 
community to intervene under UN authorization if pre-
vention fails. 
Normatively, R2P expanded the narrow focus on 
genocide, and the definitional debates that often ob-
structed effective action to prevent it, to require action 
against a broader set of international crimes against ci-
vilians. While the inclusion of ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes, and crimes against civilians marked an im-
portant step in moving the international community 
beyond paralyzing debates to prove genocidal intent 
before acting and breaking out of the numbers game of 
measuring human suffering, the normative frame for 
R2P has expanded even further first to encompass a 
general narrative of “mass atrocities” and in more re-
cent years “atrocity prevention” as a rising normative 
frame around which policymaking and practical efforts 
are now developing. While defining what constitutes 
“atrocities” or “atrocity prevention” and how it differs 
from broader violent conflict prevention may create new 
definitional debates, moving beyond R2P’s original four 
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crimes may be an important evolution to help the inter-
national community shift focus further “upstream” in its 
efforts to avert deliberate violence against civilians.  
The most critical normative shift since R2P’s adop-
tion has, in fact, been the move away from a dominant 
focus on intervention after atrocities unfold—when the 
international community’s tools are more limited and 
the consequences of spiraling violence much greater—
to a much more serious focus on prevention before the 
killing begins. Although debates over military interven-
tion can still consume the attention of policymakers and 
the press, dedicated work by a growing number of aca-
demics, policymakers, practitioners, civil society groups 
and local communities to improve capacities for early 
warning and preventive action are slowly but steadily 
gaining ground. Looking forward to the next ten years of 
international efforts to make good on the promise of 
R2P, continuing this shift in focus and resource invest-
ment toward earlier prevention will be critical. 
At the policy and structural level, important steps 
have been taken that offer some hope. The United Na-
tions, along with regional multilateral organizations in 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia, have created offices, 
dedicated positions, and governmental networks for 
early warning and response of genocide. These net-
works are made up of a growing number of govern-
ment officials being trained (often by non-
governmental organizations) in genocide and atrocity 
prevention and developing relationships across regions 
that can foster information-sharing and analysis, com-
plementary policy development, and practical action 
among decision-makers responsible for prevention and 
response within countries and regions at greatest risk. 
R2P’s primary focus not on external intervention but 
rather state responsibility for protecting populations 
has been one of the most important contributions of 
the norm, and a growing number of national govern-
ments have identified “focal points” on genocide and 
atrocity prevention and put into place new policies and 
structures for preventing and responding to mass 
atrocities. In establishing specific genocide prevention 
mechanisms within the International Conference of the 
Great Lakes Region’s, leaders in the region made a 
commitment to owning the problem of mass violence 
in their countries with the vision of moving from a 
“genocide-prone” reality to a “genocide-free” future. 
External powers are also creating internal structures to 
try to strengthen their capacities as well. The Obama 
Administration’s commitment to make mass atrocity 
prevention a “core national security interest and core 
moral responsibility of the United States”, as outlined 
in Presidential Study Directive 10 in 2011, and subse-
quent establishment of the interagency Atrocities Pre-
vention Board within the White House’s National Secu-
rity Council, is one example.  
In practice, the R2P doctrine has also been em-
ployed in a number of situations to try to prevent or 
de-escalate atrocity crises. In response to the post-
election crisis in Kenya in 2007/2008 that killed some 
1,300 people and displaced tens of thousands, the in-
ternational community invoked the responsibility to 
protect as part of a coordinated diplomatic messaging 
and mediation effort to compel the country’s leaders 
to restrain the violence and reach a negotiated settle-
ment. A multi-year preventive effort followed within 
Kenya and by many in the international community to 
avert another electoral crisis five years later. In the 
Central African Republic, as fears of genocidal violence 
rose in 2013, the international community mobilized a 
significant response to what has been one of the most 
neglected countries in the world. In this case, while the 
response still came too late to save thousands of lives 
and may be difficult to sustain for the time it will take 
to ensure a path out of decades of cycles of violence, 
governance and development crises, the role of specif-
ic atrocity prevention mechanisms like the US Atroci-
ties Prevention Board and United Nations-authorized 
peacekeepers did make a difference. In Libya in 2011, a 
NATO military intervention was mobilized to respond 
to what was seen by some as a pending slaughter of 
thousands of civilians. Unfortunately, in that case, the 
results are much less encouraging, with continued cha-
os, hundreds of armed militias, and the rise of new ex-
tremist elements targeting civilians. Now, as Burundi 
teeters on the edge of a potential atrocity crisis, the in-
ternational community is again mobilizing to apply as 
many tools as possible—high-level diplomatic engage-
ment, individual sanctions, UN Security Council action, 
human rights monitoring, peace messaging, communi-
ty radio, humanitarian aid, and other support to civil 
society. As Burundian police cracked down on civil so-
ciety protests in late April, the Burundian military 
played a remarkable role to directly protect civilians in 
the streets, a testament to the potential for civilian 
protection norms to take hold among key individuals 
and institutions even while state leaders are perpetuat-
ing abuses. 
What are the lessons we should learn from the past 
ten years and where is the R2P landscape headed? 
While we should affirm and continue supporting the 
normative, policy, and practical steps that have been 
taken over the past decade, far too many lives contin-
ue to be lost and destroyed to become complacent. 
The failures of the global community in recent years 
demand renewed commitment and concerted work to 
make R2P a reality, not just rhetoric. In Darfur, ten 
years after a massive international mobilization by 
governments and civil society, little is being done while 
civilians continue to be killed and raped in large num-
bers, having become the forgotten genocide of our 
time. In Syria, despite significant international atten-
tion, the violence continues unabated, including direct 
targeting of communities with barrel bombs and chem-
ical weapons, while a regional crisis of extremist vio-
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lence, ungoverned space, and humanitarian catastro-
phe unfolds. These and other cases underline the reali-
ty of how complex and difficult implementing R2P still 
is, and how much more still needs to be done. 
Two emerging directions can help ensure the next 
ten years build on the gains thus far and improve our 
approaches and tools for preventing violence against 
civilians in future. First, the shift toward further “up-
stream” prevention must continue. Rhetorically, we 
have come a long way since just ten years ago in focus-
ing on the need to “stop the killing before it begins” 
through better early warning and analysis, preventive 
diplomacy, and dedicated programs and funding be-
fore mass violence ensues. But the persistent challeng-
es of mobilizing political will and resources without the 
headlines of a crisis, and proving what works when 
things do not happen, remain. We need to build a 
stronger empirical evidence base on prevention 
through creative research that tackles the counterfac-
tual challenge rather than succumbing to it. And we 
need focused education, advocacy, and engagement 
with policymakers to demonstrate convincingly the re-
ality that prevention is more effective and less costly 
than responding after violence is underway. Moving 
upstream can also avoid the nasty problem of military 
interventions that seem like the only option available, 
but often introduce an additional danger into already 
highly complex and dangerous crises, fueling conflict 
and suffering in the long run. 
Second is the growing focus on strengthening local 
capacities—national capacities but particularly local 
civil society—to be more resilient against the risks of 
atrocities and mass violence. A growing body of re-
search is documenting the ways in which communities 
act, often on their own accord and sometimes in part-
nership with national and international groups, to re-
sist, rescue, and protect against attacks on civilians. 
This includes, for example, local peacebuilding, self-
protection strategies, nonviolent action, community-
based early warning and response systems, human 
rights documentation, peace messaging, and promot-
ing tolerance, dialogue, and positive economic interde-
pendence across conflict groups. Effective prevention 
requires shoring up the “front lines” where violence 
against civilians occurs. These front lines are local 
communities. Recognizing their agency (not just vic-
timhood) and primary role in helping the global com-
munity implement R2P is a necessary and critical shift 
for the coming years. Most attention and resources still 
go toward Pillar I and Pillar III, while the greatest prom-
ise lies in Pillar II, which must include supporting civil 
society, not just state capacities for protection and 
prevention. Investing more resources and support to 
local civil society so they can identify, design and de-
velop the mechanisms they need in order to build long-
term peacebuilding and prevention capacities, under-
stand and act on risks in their earliest stages, hold their 
governments accountable for protecting their popula-
tions, and engage external support from the interna-
tional community when needed, should be priority 
number one in the years ahead.  
Preventing mass violence against civilians has be-
come, rightly, a growing global cause, but it also re-
mains, tragically, a deeply local reality for far too many 
people. As such it requires both global and local solu-
tions. 
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